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Abstract
We investigate the community structure of the global ownership network of transnational corporations. We find a
pronounced organization in communities that cannot be explained by randomness. Despite the global character of this
network, communities reflect first of all the geographical location of firms, while the industrial sector plays only a marginal
role. We also analyze the meta-network in which the nodes are the communities and the links are obtained by aggregating
the links among firms belonging to pairs of communities. We analyze the network centrality of the top 50 communities and
we provide a quantitative assessment of the financial sector role in connecting the global economy.
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Introduction
A recent work has studied the global structure of ownership
network with respect to the issue of the corporate control [1]. In
this paper, instead, we carry out an in-depth community analysis
[2] of the same network, in order to address questions concerning
the level of geographical integration and the role of the financial
sector in the global economy. To our knowledge this is the first
investigation of communities in large-scale economic networks.
An economic network is a structure in which some economic
actors, represented as nodes, are connected to some other actors
by means of relationships of several types. Previous empirical
studies in socio-economic networks, that are relevant for our work,
include those focusing on: international trade [3,4], international
financial exposures [5,6] and financial networks [7–13]. More in
detail, previous works on networks relevant to corporate gover-
nance include: (i) those on corporate boards, e.g., interlocking
directorates [14–16], and those on firm ownership [1,17–20]. In
general, little attention has been devoted to the community
structure of economic networks, with the remarkable exception of
[21,22]. Apart from the study of [23] on the Italian corporate
board and ownership networks, the other community analyses
have focused so far on correlation networks in stock markets [24]
and in foreign exchange markets [25].
Our study of the transnational corporation (TNC) ownership
network reveals that the majority of the corporations take part in
the largest connected component but at the same time display a
pronounced organization in communities. Only few algorithms in
the literature are suitable to the investigation of large networks
without imposing constraints on the number of communities [26].
We first perform the community analysis by applying the method
of [27] (hereafter, Louvain method) and we further apply the
method of the hierarchical map equation [28] (hereafter, Infomap
method). In order to asses the robustness of the resulting
community partitions, we compare the community structure in
the empirical network with the one obtained from a random link
formation process, accounting for the constraints on the degree
distribution and on the ownership structure [18,29,30]. The
comparison reveals that for the rewired networks the community
structure is quite homogeneous across realizations and differs
considerably from the one of the empirical network. This means
that the community structure cannot be considered the result of a
random pattern of link formation. Furthermore, we find that firms
in the same community tend to share similar geographical location
and industrial sector classification. However, the country domi-
nance tends to be more pronounced than the sector dominance.
These results are replicated when a different community detection
method is applied. Indeed, the communities identified by the [28]
algorithm, Infomap hereafter, which is based on a flow and
information theoretic clustering method, maintain the geograph-
ical and sector properties.
Finally, we consider communities as themselves forming a meta-
network [31], in which the link between any two given
communities reflects the number of ownership relations among
firms from the two communities. We assess the importance of each
community in the network by using DebtRank, a centrality
measure recently introduced in the complex networks literature in
the context of economics [9]. In particular, we apply this method
to verify whether the financial sector is a major source of
connection among different communities. We find that the
community centrality and, thus the potential impact that each
community has on the others, changes drastically when we exclude
from the sample the firms belonging to the financial sector. Such a
difference in centrality quantifies the role played by the financial
sector in linking communities of firms characterized by different
geographic location and industrial sector.
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Materials and Methods
Data
The dataset we investigate in this paper is the same that was
analyzed in [1] and extracted, by means of the procedure
explained in the following, from the Orbis 2007 database (URL:
http://www.bvdep.com/en/ORBIS) containing information as of
the last quarter of 2007 for more than 30 million economic actors
(firms and shareholders). It includes the name of firms, their
geographical localization (country and city), industrial classifica-
tion (NACE) and several financial data. Moreover, the database
includes data on about 12 million ownership relations, with
information on the name of the shareholder and the amount of
shares.
The procedure of extraction is an important part of the methods
and it works as follows. We first identify all the transnational
corporations (TNC), defined as those companies that are
headquartered in one country and operate in at least one foreign
country, by owning partially, at least 10% of the shares, or wholly
other companies [32]. We obtain a list of 43060 TNCs, located in
115 different countries. The major part of these TNCs have their
headquarters in Europe and the US. Nevertheless, some of them
are also located in off-shore countries like Bermuda (with 139
companies) and Cayman Islands (with 40 companies). Then, we
explore recursively the neighborhood of the TNC companies in
the whole database. Two recursive searches are applied: (i) we
proceed downstream by identifying all the participated companies
directly and indirectly owned by the TNCs with a breadth-first
search procedure; (ii) we proceed upstream with the same
procedure in order to find the shareholders that have direct and
indirect paths leading to the TNCs. In this way, we assemble a
network in which each node is connected to at least one TNC.
The resulting network consists of 600508 nodes corresponding to
economic entities and 1006987 links corresponding to corporate
ownership relations.
In an ownership network, the nodes correspond to economic
entities (e.g., companies or people owning equity shares) and the
links to ownership relationships connecting them. We recall that a
network G is defined as the set of nodes N and the set E of edges
represented by ordered pairs of nodes fs, tg, with s being the
source and t the target nodes of the edge s?t: The weighted
adjacency matrix of the network is A~fai, jg, where ai, j is the
share that i owns in j: The network does not contain self-loops and
the sum of shares of a firm held by other entities can not exceed
100%, i.e.,
P
i ai jƒ1 V j: The in-degree, k
in
i , is the number of
incoming links to a node i, that is, according to the convention we
follow here, the number of shareholders. The out-degree, kouti ,
refers, instead, to the number of node i’s outgoing links and
represents the number of firms in i’s portfolio. A connected
component is a subgraph in which all the nodes can reach all the
other nodes via an undirected path.
Community Detection Procedure
In the field of complex networks, the notion of ‘‘community’’
corresponds, loosely speaking, to a subset of nodes that are more
densely connected among themselves than with the nodes outside
the subset. Several definitions of community and methods to detect
communities have been proposed in the literature (see [2] for a
review). Most algorithms can be distinguished in divisive [33],
agglomerative [34] and optimization-based [35]. In the latter case,
the goodness of the partitions is commonly assessed in terms of the
so-called ‘‘modularity’’ [33].
The modularity takes values between {1 and 1 and compares
the density of the links within the communities with those across
communities. Positive values of modularity are a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the presence of communities, since even
random graphs can have positive values. Therefore, the values
obtained have to be compared with those obtained in ensembles of
rewired networks (see more below). Despite the resolution limits of
modularity optimization methods [36], especially in detecting
small clusters, it has been found to be one of the best methods for
network partition. Among the available detection algorithms of the
optimization-based class, in this study, we apply the Louvain
method which is one of the few methods that are suitable: (i) to
analyze large networks with good scalability properties [37] and (ii)
to avoid ex-ante assumptions on their size [26,38].
For the sake of robustness, we also run the community analysis
with the Infomap algorithm proposed by [28]. Indeed, among the
many available ones, this methods has been proved to be one of
the best in terms of performance as it is able to process efficiently
large networks even in the case of weighted and directed links
[37,38]. This algorithm uses a flow-based and information
theoretic clustering method, called the map equation, to uncover
the important multilevel structures and their relationships. It
determines how many hierarchical levels there are in the network
and how many modules are present at each level [28].
Notice that, for the community detection analysis, we have
utilized the unweighted and undirected version of the two
algorithms described above, for the following reasons. The weight
of a link represents a share and, thus, a number between 0 and 1.
The weight of links pointing to big firms are typically small, since
no single shareholder is able to own (or interested in owning) a
large fraction of the capital. Therefore, assigning an importance to
the links proportional to the share would result in treating
shareholding relations to large firms as very weak links, thus
inducing a bias in the communities towards small firms. A more
appropriate way to proceed could be to try and account for the
monetary value of the links, which depends on the value of the
firm owned. Unfortunately, this value is not available in the
database for all the firms. Moreover, it would not be clear how to
normalize the values in order to use them within the algorithm.
As for the direction of the links, this is clearly crucial in the
computation of the potential control of a company on the ones in
which it owns shares [1]. However, if we are interested in the
structure of groups of economic interest the flow of resources and
information is reciprocal and not unidirectional. On the one side,
if company A owns shares of company B, then it can influence,
with its voting rights and representatives, the decision making
process in B’s board of directors. The presence of representatives
of A in B determines also a flow of information from A to B, so that
decisions may spread from a board to another [39]. On the other
side, the economic performance of B, especially if it is a subsidiary
of A, affects A’s profits via its shares. Further, A may shift
resources from a subsidiary to another for strategic reasons,
depending on the economic performance and the business strategy
of A. Therefore, there is also a flow of information from A to B.
The community detection method Infomap uses the direction of
the links to detect the different levels of hierarchy in the network
and, within each level, to further split modules apart. While this
may be an interesting question, it is not the focus of our paper.
Here, we are interested in communities meant as groups of interest
[40]. Therefore, in line with previous community analyses in
ownership networks [23], when running the community detection
algorithms we consider the network as undirected.
Further, we want to compare the community structure in the
empirical network with the one resulting from a random link
formation process. In order to account for constraints that arise
from the degree distribution, it is custom to generate ensembles of
Communities in the Corporate Network
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synthetic networks by applying a degree-preserving rewiring
procedure [18,29,30]. When rewiring the links in an ownership
network, it is important to satisfy two main constraints: (i) the
degree sequence, i.e., the number of outgoing and ingoing links of
each economic entity; and (ii) the total number of ownership
shares owned by the shareholders. It is also important to preserve
the link directionality in order to not exceed the number of total
shares of a company owned by others. Notice that even if we do
not use the link weight in the community detection algorithms, it is
still important to impose condition (ii) because it correctly
constraints the space of possible networks that are generated by
the rewiring process.
We, thus, follow the procedure described in [18] (leaving out the
additional constraint on the geographical location of firms and




The TNC ownership network is composed of 23825 connected
components. The largest component contains 463006 nodes (77%
of the total), while the second largest connected component
contains 230 nodes and 90% of the components have less than 10
nodes. We report in Fig. 1 the distribution of the component size.
Notice how the data point corresponding to the largest component
deviates from the trend of all the other components. A power law
fit of the data points excluding the largest component is shown for
reference, yielding an exponent of 2.13.
In the following we have restricted our community analysis to
the largest connected component (LCC).
In our empirical network, the Louvain algorithm find 6824
communities connected by 25588 links, while the modularity
reaches the value of 0.7344. Communities are very heterogeneous
in size, ranging from those with only few nodes to the two main
communities with about 50 thousands nodes. The 99% of the
communities contains less than 1000 nodes and 95% less than 100.
The distribution is reported in Fig. 2, in red.
For the rewired networks we find that they are quite
homogeneous across realizations, in terms of their community
structure, but they differ from the empirical network. They
contain, on average, 11977+135 communities, almost the double
than the empirical network (6824). The number of links among
communities, however, is similar in the synthetic case
(28284+654) and in the empirical case (25588). In the empirical
network, the value of modularity (0:7344) is about 30% larger than
in the rewired networks (0:5242+0:0002). The difference is much
larger than 3 times the std in the ensemble of rewired networks.
This means that, in terms of modularity, it is very unlikely that the
empirical network would occur through a random rewiring
process of a network with the same degree sequence and in-
weigths. Similarly, the community size distribution in the
empirical network (in red) strongly deviates from those obtained
from all the rewired networks (in blue color scale, in Fig. 2). We
thus conclude that the community structure deviate significantly
Figure 1. Decumulative distribution function of the size of the connected components. As a comparison, a power-law fit with exponent
2:13 is shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104655.g001
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from the one that would occur by chance in a network with the
same characteristics of degree sequence and weights.
Characterization of Communities in terms of Geography
and Sector
In this section we aim to investigate the existence of
geographical and sectoral patterns in the detected communities.
We start this exercise by analyzing the eight top largest
communities, which together comprise 1=3 of all the nodes. The
results are summarized in Table 1. For each community, the table
reports: the number of firms (# firms); (2) the name of the first and
the second countries (C1 and C2), and the name of the first and
the second sector (Sector1 and Sector2) by number of firms within
that community. Moreover, for each community, we sort countries
and sectors by their number of firms in the community and we
report the percentage of firms for the dominant country and sector
– i.e. the top ones by number of firms– (% C1 and % S1). We also
report the country and sector concentration, in terms of number of
firms, of each community, as measured by the Herfindhal index
(Herf. C and Herf. S).
As we can see from the table, the share of firms located in the
dominant country is rarely below 0.5 and the Herfindahl index is
constantly above the limit between medium and high concentra-
tion (i.e., 0.25). However, for some communities the Herfindhal
index also reveals that there is more than one dominating country.
Indeed, for example in community 2, C1 and C2 contribute
roughly equally to the community dominance. The role of
geography is evident also in the first 100 biggest communities,
which are almost all dominated by a single country located within
the North America and Europe boundaries. The first Asian-
dominated community is at rank 12t h by size (Asian firms, indeed,
are dominant only in few communities. The existence of only few
and small Asian communities could be due to the traditional
organization of Asian corporations in business groups [41], where
members are densely connected in relatively small groups with few
or no connections with external firms.). For the characterization of
communities in terms of sectors, we group all sectors in six macro-
sectors (primary, manufacturing, services, financial intermediaries,
real estates, renting and business activities, and state and social
sectors). The share of the dominant sector in the top eight largest
communities is generally smaller than the share of the dominant
Figure 2. Decumulative distribution function of the size of the communities in the empirical (in red) and in all reshuffled (in blue
scale) networks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104655.g002
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country, even if the number of possible macro-sectors, i.e. 6, is
much smaller than the number of possible countries (Table 1).
When we average across all communities with minimum size of 5
nodes, the share of firms belonging to the leading country of each
community is 80% in the empirical network as opposed to 25% in
the rewired networks. Similarly, the share of firms belonging to the
leading sector is 70% against the 35% in the rewired networks.
Fig. 3 illustrates the geography and sector dominance of all the
communities. The x and y axes represent the share of firms in the
dominant sector and country of the community. The size of the
circle reflects the size of the community in log scale and the color
reflects the geographical region of the dominant country. As we
can see, the fact that most circles are located above the diagonal
implies that the country dominance tends to be more pronounced
than the sector dominance. Many small communities are
completely dominated by a country (value 1 or close to 1 on the
y-axis).
Notice also that the two largest communities account together
for about 1/5 of all the nodes and comprise companies mainly
located in the US and Great Britain, respectively. Here below we
provide some more details:
N The first biggest community includes 54065 economic entities.
It is dominated by companies mainly located in North
America (65%), in particular in the US (59%) and Canada
(7%), while 10% of all the firms are located in three Asian
countries (Japan, Taiwan and Korea). From a sector point of
view, the nodes do not show a unique pattern: roughly 1/4 of
the nodes belong, respectively, to the services, manufacturing
and real estates, renting and business activities sectors. Finally,
even if this community includes only 2283 TNCs (5% of the
total), in terms of operating revenue, it represents roughly 34%
of the total TNC value.
N The second largest community has 49475 members, of which
2004 TNCs accounting for the 17% of the total operating
revenue. Geographically speaking, the nodes belong, almost
completely, to European countries (89%), with Great Britain
(42%) leading the other countries (Germany is represented by
9.6% of nodes, France by 6%, Sweden by 5% and Italy by
4%.). The largest part of the companies are in the business
activity industry (39%), while the services and manufacturing
sectors account for 20% and 18% respectively.
Further, we apply the community characterization algorithm
introduced in [42]. This statistical method reveals if a particular
attribute of a community is ‘‘over-expressed’’, i.e., if its frequency
in the community is larger than what expected from a random
occurrence of the attribute across all the nodes in the network. The




corresponds to the number of observable node attributes, as
suggested by the method authors [42]. On the one hand, by taking
the location in a country as attribute and considering that in the
whole network firms belong to 194 different countries, the
algorithm finds that at least one country is over-expressed in all
the large communities (i.e. larger than 250 nodes) and in about
50% of the smaller ones. In some communities, especially in the
largest ones, more than one country is over-expressed (e.g., in the
top two communities), see Table 2. On the other hand, the sector
attribute is less over-expressed than the geographical attribute.
Indeed, only in roughly 30% of all the communities at least one
sector is over-expressed. Only the top ten largest communities
display an over-expression of the sector, while many of the smaller









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Communities in the Corporate Network
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 August 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 8 | e104655
communities is reported in Table 3). These findings are not
replicated when we repeat the analysis for the communities
detected in the rewired networks. Indeed, on average, only the
0.28% of the geographical attributes of the communities of these
rewired networks is over-estimated, about 65 times less than in the
real network communities, where the 20% of the geographical
attributes is over-expressed. The same result is worth for the sector
attributes, the 0.03% of sectors is over-expressed in the reshuffled
network communities, compared to the 15% of the real network
ones.
Overall, the results of these analyses show that the community
structure reflects the location of firms in the geographical space,
while the role of the sector is much less important.
Robustness Analysis
In order to investigate the robustness of our findings, we have
repeated the analysis by employing the Infomap algorithm,
proposed by [28].
The run of this algorithm on the unweighted and undirected
ownership network has returned 1180 communities, about 5000
less than the Louvain algorithm, thus larger communities. Indeed,
the largest community has about 160000 nodes, about three times
the size of the largest one found with the other algorithm (see
Table 4). However, we have found that this large community
comprises more than the 80% of the nodes of the two largest
communities detected with the Louvain algorithm. Such outcome
is quite comprehensible because of the hierarchical mapping
method of the Infomap algorithm and the pyramid-like structure
of the ownership network. Nevertheless, the partitions obtained
with the two algorithms are not so dissimilar according to the
Figure 3. The x and y coordinate of a given circle represent, respectively, the share of firms in the dominant sector and country of a
given community. Moving along the x axes corresponds, for a community, to have more firms from the dominant sector. While moving along the y
axes corresponds, for a community, to have more firms from the dominant country. For instance, a circle in the top right area represents a community
with a large fraction of firms from one sector and one country. The size of the circles is proportional to the number of firms belonging to the
community, while the color to the firm localization country (blue for EU, red for North American, yellow for Asian, green for fiscal paradise and
magenta for all the other countries). The fact that most circles are located above the diagonal implies that the country dominance tends to be more
pronounced than the sector dominance. This is particularly true for small communities.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104655.g003
Communities in the Corporate Network
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Mutual Information [43] and the Variation of Information [44]
methods. The first one is a measure of the coincidence of two
partitions, ranging from 0 -minimum coincidence- to 1 -maximum
coincidence-. In our networks, the comparison of the two
partitions yields a value of 0.67. The second method is a measure
of the lack of information when one aims to infer partition 1 given
partition 2, and vice versa. It ranges from 0 -maximum similarity-
to log(n) -minimum similarity-, with n being the number of nodes
(thus, about 13 in our network), and applied to the Louvain and
Infomap partitions it yields a value of 3.29.
Furthermore, we have applied the so-called precision-recall
method to compare the node partitions found by the Louvain and
the Infomap methods. We have assumed the Infomap partition as




) as follows. Recall is defined as the
fraction of nodes in a Louvain community that are also in the same
community with the Infomap method. Precision is defined as the
fraction of nodes in an Infomap community that also belong to the
same community with the Louvain method. F-score values range
from 0 (worst score) to 1 (best score). In our analysis, we find
F~0:59, with precision of 0.42 and the recall of 1. This implies
that the Infomap algorithm, compared to the ‘‘benchmark’’
Louvain algorithm, returned most of the relevant results, while it
also returned both relevant and irrelevant results.
Finally, we carry out a simple analysis of community similarity
by counting the number of firms belonging at the same time to a
given Louvain community and to an Infomap community. As
shown in Fig. 4, the majority of nodes of the top 20 Louvain
communities belong only to one Infomap community.
The community geographical and sector properties are
replicated. Indeed, all the communities shows an high geograph-
ical concentration, with an Herfindahl index higher than 0.25 in
the 82% of the communities, while the share of communities
showing an high country dominance (i.e. communities populated
by more than 50% by firms belonging to the same country) are
about the 80%. The same is true for the sector feature, with the
97% of the communities having a high concentration, according to
the Herfindhal index. This patterns are also true for the top 8
communities, as reported in Table 4.
Table 2. Statistics of the country characterization across communities.
Comm # firms Countries over-expressed
1 54065 US (43.05%) JP (75.08%) CA (41.85%) AU (44.49%) BM (51.81%)
ZA (40.78%) IN (35.25) KR (25.26%) KY (45.96%) SG (28.67%)
CN (28.60%) IL (53.42%) BR (21.70%) HK (36.13%) TW (18.47%)
ID (56.44%) PH (43.11%) TH (29.27%)
2 49475 GB (17.10%) FI (36.12%) SE (20.46%) PL (26.68%) CH (19.88%)
TH (45.51%) GR (19.37%) NO (14.36%) IT (13.06%) RU (18.01%)
IE (31.49%) DK (12.98%) LU (14.64%) LI (41.92%) IS (33.33%)
3 14917 ES (52.25%) PT (9.81%) PE (23.75%) AT (5.21%) BR (6.30%)
4 11658 FR (20.50%)
5 10475 DE (14.85%) LU (4.51%)
6 6462 IT (32.28%) RO (57.14%)
7 6375 DE (6.89%) RU (11.83%) CH (6.43%)
8 5420 NL (5.21%) BE (21.27%) LU (4.65%)
The name of each over-expressed country is reported for the top 8 communities. In parentheses, the percentage share of firms belonging to each over-expressed
country in the selected community with respect to the total number of firms of that country.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104655.t002
Table 3. Statistics of the sector characterization across communities.
Comm # firms Sectors over-expressed
1 54065 financial interm. (19.16%) manufacturing (19.91%) primary (26.26%)
services (12.11%)
2 49475 primary (13.41%) financial interm. (11.45%)
3 14917 services (4.18%) state and social (4.02%) business activities (3.42%)
4 11658 business activities (3.38%) manufacturing (3.15%)
5 10475 business activities (4.71%) financial interm. (3.02%)
6 6462 services (1.79)
7 6375 services (6.35%) state and social (2.09%) primary (2.15%)
8 5420 financial interm. (3.29%) business activities (1.48%)
The name of each over-expressed sector is reported for the top 8 communities. In parenthesis, we report the percentage of firms belonging to each over-expressed
sector in the selected community with respect to the total number of firms of that sector.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104655.t003
Communities in the Corporate Network
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The Community Meta-Network and the Role of Financial
Sector
One can also think of communities as the nodes of a network,
where the links connecting them are weighted by the number of
links between firms in the two communities [29] [31]. The
network of the top eight communities by size is shown in Fig. 5.
In order to gain further insight into the whole community
network, we start with a basic network analysis. The bow-tie
decomposition of the network yields to the largest strongly
connected component (LSCC) of 528 nodes, an IN-component
of 309 nodes and an OUT-component of 5987. Notice that in the
community meta-network the LSCC relative size (7.74%) is much
larger than in the firm-shareholder network (1347 nodes out of
about 400 thousand, i.e. 0.3% [1]). This has a simple explanation.
Consider a community in the OUT. Since links among
communities are obtained aggregating links between shareholders
and firms, it is enough for that community to have one of its firms
investing in a firm belonging to one of the communities in the
LSCC to make the community enter the LSCC. However, with a
relative size of 7.74%, the LSCC of the meta-network is still much
smaller in relative terms than in other paradigmatic real-world
networks, such as wikipedia or the world-wide-web [45]. The
degree statistics yields: average in-degree ~2:5+8:7, max in-
degree ~557, average out-degree ~2:5+62, max out-degree
~4146. For the shortest paths we find: maximum ~4; average
2:43+0:51. The link density is 3:1  10{4.
Financial intermediaries are well integrated in the network and
hold many ownership shares in companies belonging to both the
non-financial and the financial sector. In fact, in our sample
although they represent only a small fraction (9%), at the same
time they account for the 36% of all the ownership relations in the
network. Many of these relations appear to have a strategic nature.
Indeed, the financial intermediaries hold shares larger than 5% in
13% of non-financial companies and in 60% of other financial
companies. In order to assess the role of the financial sector as a
source of the connections among communities, we repeat the
above statistics for the network of communities obtained by
removing from each community the firms (46632 in total) that
belong to the financial sector (i.e., companies having NACE codes
in the classes [6500–7000) and named ‘‘financial intermediation,
except insurance and pension funding’’), and all their links (351587
in total).
The bow-tie decomposition yields now 903 isolated nodes. The
LSCC (381 nodes) shrinks by 25%, the IN-component (226 nodes)
by 27% and the OUT-component (4799 nodes) by 20%. The
degree statistics yields: average in-degree ~2:3+6:5, max in-
degree ~394, average out-degree ~2:3+49, max out-degree
~3157. For the shortest paths: maximum ~4; average
2:45+0:52. The link density is 3:6  10{4. Because some links
have been removed, the degree statistics has to decrease and the
shortest path statistics has to increase, but the change is small.
As we notice, overall the topology remains close to the case with
the financial sector. In contrast, the removal of the financial sector
has a strong impact at the level of the weight of the links among
communities. Indeed, after removing the firms in financial sector,
the number of ownership relations among firms decreases sharply
(see Table 5). For instance, in the 8th community (the one with the
highest share of financial intermediaries), the number of firms
decreases by 29% and the number of direct links by 42%. On the
other hand, the community less affected by the financial sector is
the 7th, with 3% of removed companies and a reduction of only
340 links. Overall, the links among communities decrease more
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7th biggest community which counts a small number of financial
intermediaries, such result holds for all the communities analyzed.
In some cases, the decrease is very strong. For example, the 1st
biggest community experiences a drop of 2/3 of the links within
itself, and of about 85% of the links directed to the 2nd biggest
community. This does not happen when we repeat the exercises by
considering the other sectors. Indeed, by removing the links
between firms, these sectors suffer of a drop in the community
connectivity which does not overcome the 30%, with rare
exceptions as, for example, the connection between the 7st and
the 1st communities, due to the firms in the primary sector
dropping by 70% and the connection between the 5th and the 5th
and 7th communities, due to the firms in the business activity
sector dropping by 80%.
Finally, in order to assess the relative importance of each
community we use DebtRank, a centrality measure recently
introduced in complex networks literature in the context of
economic networks [9]. Beyond the interpretation in terms of
economic loss due the distress of one or more nodes in the
network, DebtRank can be used as a measure of importance, once
a network of impact is defined. Here, we define the impact of
community i over j as the ratio between the number of
investments of community j into i over the number of investments
within community j, that is Wi j~bAj i=Aj j , where b is a rescaling
factor that for visualization purposes we set equal to the number of
nodes in the network under observation, b~50. Notice that here
we only aim to compare the importance of the communities in the
case with and without the financial sector. Traditional measures of
centrality are not well suited for this purpose. For instance,
Eigenvector Centrality is defined only on strongly connected
graphs, or equivalently, on undirected graphs. Other measures of
impact, e.g., [10], require a normalization of the impact matrix
which then prevents from making an absolute comparison of the
importance of a given node across different networks (see [9] for
more details).
Fig. 6, B, illustrates the network of the top 50 communities in a
diagram where the position of each community reflects its
centrality, as measured by DebtRank. More central communities
are located in the center of the diagram. The size of each node is
proportional to the number of firms in the community, the color
corresponds to the dominant sector, while the label indicates the
dominant country. As we can expect, the top communities by size
Figure 4. Scatter plot of the top 20 communities with the Louvain (row) and the Infomap (column) algorithms. The color intensity
indicates the percentage of nodes that belong, at the same time, to a Louvain and a Infomap community, computed with respect to the minimum
size of the two communities.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104655.g004
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are also more central. Fig. 6, A, illustrates the network of the top
50 communities after removing the firms in the financial sector. In
this case, the top communities lose much of their centrality. As we
can see, while the topological properties that do not account for
the weight of the links are only moderately affected by the removal
of the financial sector, the centrality computed with DebtRank,
which do take weights into account, changes drastically. The
difference in centrality quantifies the role played by the financial
sector in the strength of the links among communities and, thus, in
determining the potential impact that each community has on the
Figure 5. Nodes correspond to the top eight communities and they are labeled with the abbreviation of the dominating countries,
colored in blue if EU countries and in red for the US. The node size is proportional to the number of firms populating the community. Edge
labels indicate the number of links between communities (in thousand). The links with less than 50 ownership relations have been omitted.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104655.g005
Table 5. Statistics on the largest communities with and without financial intermediaries.
With financial sector Without financial sector
community # firms # rel. density # firms # rel. density
1 54065 256607 8779e-05 45129 78040 3847e-05
2 49475 109880 4489e-06 44136 52713 2712e-05
3 14917 20799 9348e-05 13529 15726 8892e-05
4 11658 14186 1143e-04 10487 7545 8336e-05
5 10475 12893 1175e-04 9066 6627 1015e-04
6 6462 7812 1711e-04 5781 6541 1530e-04
7 6375 7952 1956e-04 6208 7526 1847e-04
8 5420 7876 2681e-04 3887 3824 1871e-04
The size, the number of directed relations and the density are reported.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104655.t005
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Figure 6. Nodes represent the communities. Outgoing links represent the estimated potential impact of a community to another one. The
closer a node is to the center the higher is its DebtRank (e.g., its centrality). The size of the node reflects the number of firms in the community (the
size is set larger than a minimum, for visualization purposes). The color of the nodes corresponds to the dominant sector country, as well as the label.
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others. This change is very marginal when we consider the other
sectors. Indeed, as it is possible to observe in Fig. 6, C–G, all the
communities remain quite central after removing the firms and
links belonging to the sectors: primary, manufacturing, services,
real estates, renting and business activities, and state and social.
In order to test more directly the effect of removing the financial
sector, we recompute the values of DebtRank after randomly
removing the same number of firms and links as in the financial
sector. We construct 25 such sample and we compute the average
(plus and minus the standard deviation) of the DebtRank values of
the same communities. Fig. 7 compare the DebtRank values of
each of the top 50 communities in the three cases: the whole
network (red), the network without the financial sector (blue), the
ensemble of networks with randomly removed firms (green). The
figure shows, that removing the financial sector has an effect on
the centrality of each community that in most cases deviates from
the one of randomly removing an equivalent number of firms.
Concluding Remarks
This paper is a follow up of a previous study on the global
corporate network, i.e. the network of ownership among
transnational corporations [1]. The present study focuses on the
The color of a link reflects the DebtRank of the node from which it originates (see [9] for more detail on the figure construction). Community network
after removing from the community partition the firms in the financial246632 firms- (A), in the original dataset (B) and after removing manufacturing
266212 firms- (C), primary 25787 firms- (D), business activities 2130587 firms- (E), services 299839 firms- (F) and state and social 221355 firms- (G)
sectors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104655.g006
Figure 7. Comparison of Debtrank: the case with no financial sector vs randomized samples. Each curve displays the values of Debtrank
(y-axis) across the top communities, sorted in descending order. On the x-axis is the index of the community according to this sorting. The red curve
refers to the whole network. The blue dots refer to the network in which the financial sector has been removed. The solid green curve is the average
across the 25 randomized samples, while the upper and lower green dashed curves correspond to the average plus or minus one standard deviation
of the values on the y-axis in the 25 samples. The figure shows, that removing the financial sector has an effect on the centrality of the community
that deviates strongly from the one of randomly removing an equivalent number of firms.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104655.g007
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community structure of such network and to our knowledge it is
the first investigation of communities in large-scale economic
networks. The global corporate network is obtained from a large
database of corporate information with a snowball procedure that
starts from a list of about 43 thousand transnational corporations
and recursively explores all the incoming and outgoing ownership
relations building a network of about 600 thousand economic
entities.
We have found a pronounced organization in communities that
cannot be explained by randomness. Moreover, we find that most
communities are characterized by a dominant country, in the
sense that the fraction of firms belonging to that country are not
only the (relative) majority, but are over-expressed with respect to
what would happen if the nationality is distributed at random
among the firms. The characterization in terms of sectors is
significant, but less pronounced than the one for countries. Thus,
we conclude that the global corporate network is strongly clustered
in communities, where geography is the major driver while sector
is not so important.
We have also analyzed the community meta-network, i.e. the
network in which nodes are the communities and links are
obtained aggregating the links among the firms belonging to pairs
of communities. In order to assess the role of the financial sector in
the architecture of the global corporate network, we have analyzed
the centrality of the top 50 communities by means of the
DebtRank algorithm [9]. This has allowed us to obtain an absolute
measure of the importance of each community, which we have
then used to compare the case with and without the firms in the
financial sector. The difference between these two cases has
provided a first quantitative assessment of the role of the financial
sector in connecting corporations across countries and sectors.
These findings contribute to the literature about geographic
integration and financialization of global economy.
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